交通部关于颁发《港口总体布局规划编制方法》的通知
交通部
交通部关于颁发《港口总体布局规划编制方法》的通知
交通部
为了强化港口发展的行业管理和宏观控制，健全港口建设的科学管理机制，使港口总体布局规划工作程序化、规范化、方法科学化，现发布《港口总体布局规划编制办法》，自一九九0年二月四日起施行。
港口总体布局规划编制办法
第一条 为了强化港口发展的行业管理和宏观控制，健全港口建设的科学管理机制，使港口总体布局规划工作程序化、规范化、方法科学化，在总结改革开放以来港口建设前期工作和港口总体布局规划工作经验的基础上，吸取国内外制订港口总体布局规划方面的有益理论和经验，结合
当前我国港口发展中的实际问题，特制订本办法。
第二条 港口总体布局规划是根据全国资源、生产力布局和港口自身特点以及未来的发展战略，制订的布局性规划。它是港口建设管理大系统中决策管理系统的重要环节，属港口建设前期工作的重要组成部分，是制订中长期建设规划、计划，选择建设项目的主要依据。是确保港口持续
、稳定、协调发展，防止盲目性和随意性的重要手段。港口总体布局规划属港口城市总体规划的重要组成部分，是对城市总体规划的具体充实、完善。
第三条 制定港口总体布局规划必须坚决贯彻党中央、国务院制定的战略方针和战略目标，充分体现党的十三大确定的“以发展综合运输体系为主轴的交通业”的方针和国民经济持续、稳定、协调发展的方针；牢固树立全局观点，使港口的总体布局规划服从于社会经济发展的总战略、
总目标，服从于全国运输网和全国港口布局规划，妥善安排港口的集疏运布局；严格执行国家颁布的有关政策、法规和有关制度，严格执行港口工程有关的经济、技术标准。
第四条 港口总体布局规划的主要任务是：在充分的调查研究和必要的勘察工作基础上，深入剖析港口现状，研究港口发展中的问题，揭露存在的主要矛盾；要通过定量分析，论证港口的经济腹地，预测规划期的发展需要；确定港口的性质与功能；根据深水深用，浅水浅用，各得其所
的原则，做出港口所在城市辖区的不同岸线、不同水域、不同港区的合理布局和全港的水、陆域的总体布局，明确不同港区的具体功能；划定港区水、陆域界限，标明港界坐标；根据发展预测提出分期实施的建设序列。
第五条 制定港口总体布局规划要坚持实事求是，讲究科学，讲究经济效益的原则。一切要从国情、港情实际出发，放眼未来；既要吸取国内外有益的经验和技术，又不能盲目追求高标准，规划方案要以科学数据为依据，水域、陆域规划需具备必要的钻探、测量资料，要通过多方案比
较，优选最佳方案，妥善处理各类港区，各种码头泊位的布局。
第六条 港口总体布局规划报告的主要内容包括：港口的地理位置、自然条件、现状及评价；要通过历史发展的分析，认识特点，提示矛盾，提出问题；要通过现状分析和发展预测，论证港口的性质与功能，确定港口的经济腹地；要通过多种方法科学预测未来港口的发展水平，分析发
展特点；要从港口的货源特点和自然条件出发，进行到港船型的发展预测；根据岸线和水陆条件，结合客、物流特点及本地区经济发展格局做出包括岸线利用、陆域布局、水域布局、港区划分、港界划分、环境保护、配套设施在内的总体布局规划；反映实施总体布局规划所安排的建设序列
；提出总体布局规划方案中存在的问题，解决的措施和建议，并附有反映规划方案的有关图纸（详见附件：港口总体布局规划文本格式及内容要求）。
第七条 港口总体布局规划由港务局负责组织编制。编制港口总体布局规划必须由拥有经济、营运、工程各类专业技术人员组成的专门工作班子负责。凡没有专门规划工作班子的单位，属大、中型港口可委托持有甲级设计证书的水运工程勘察设计院和规划院承担，地方小型港口可委托
持乙级设计证书单位承担。大中型港口总体布局规划编就后应由港务局先行组织预审后再上报交通部一式三十份，同时抄报所在省、市政府主管部门。地方小型港口总体布局规划编就后应由地方港航部门先行预审后再上报省、市人民政府主管部门，抄报交通部。内河港口同时抄报所在的水
系规划办公室。
第八条 港口总体布局规划上报后，大、中型港口由交通部与所在省、市人民政府组织有关部门有关专家进行联合审查，提出审查意见。港务局根据审查意见，组织修改后，由交通部与所在省、市人民政府联合审批。地方小型港口的总体布局规划由省、市人民政府主管部门组织审查，
交通部交通部授权的水系规划办公室派员参加，审查后的总体布局规划由省、市主管部门办理审批文件。审批后的港口总体布局规划，未经审批机关批准不得任意修改。
第九条 凡港务局委托规划设计单位编制的总体布局规划事前要签订合同，要明确具体要求，规划报告经主管机关审查如不符合要求需要修改时，规划设计单位应负责限期完成修改补充任务。
第十条 港口总体布局规划一般由三部分组成，即规划报告、规划图纸、主要附件等。规划报告的外形尺寸按十六开（210ｍｍ×297ｍｍ）装帧，规划报告要与规划图纸合并装订，上报文件封皮为浅兰色，审批后颁布文件的封皮为湖兰色。
第十一条 本办法对海、河港口，新港口、新港区开发和老港口技术改造的总体布局规划均适用。地方小型港口，各省、市可根据本办法基本原则，结合各自情况适当简化，制订补充规定。
第十二条 本办法的解释权属交通部。
第十三条 本办法自一九九0年二月四日起施行。
附件：港口总体布局规划文本格式及内容要求
Ⅰ．封面格式
××港总体布局规划
××港务局
年 月
Ⅱ．扉页格式
××港总体布局规划
编制单位 （盖 章）
单位负责人 （签 章）
总工程师 （签 章）
项目负责人 （签 章）
主要专业负责人 （职务或职称）
参加单位 （盖 章）
主办人 （职务或职称）
参加人员 （职务或职称）
Ⅲ．目录
目 录
第一章 地理位置、自然条件、现状及评价
第一节 地理位置
第二节 自然条件
第三节 现 状
第四节 评 价
第二章 吞吐量发展水平预测
第一节 经济腹地
第二节 吞吐量发展水平预测
第三章 性质和功能
第四章 船型发展预测
第五章 岸线利用规划
第一节 规划原则
第二节 岸线利用规划
第六章 总体布局规划
第一节 规划原则
第二节 陆域布局规划
第三节 水域布局规划
第四节 港 界
第七章 配套工程布局规划
第八章 环境影响评价及环境保护规划
第一节 规划港区的环境现状
第二节 规划期各个阶段的主要污染源和污染物分析
第三节 港区可能出现的生态变化
第四节 控制污染和生态变化的规划和治理措施
第五节 环境影响分析和评价
第九章 规划的分期实施
第十章 问题及建议
附 图
1．经济腹地形势图
2．港口所在地理位置图
3．港口现状图
4．港口总体布局规划图
5．港口集疏运通道规划图
6．港口水、陆域界限图
附 件
吞吐量发展水平预测报告
Ⅳ．文本格式及内容要求
前 言
一、概述港口的历史发展沿革和编制规划的依据（包括主要参考文件）
二、规划目标、原则和方法
三、规划期限
第一章 地理位置、自然条件、现状及评价
第一节 地 理 位 置
概述港口的地理位置、交通概况。
第二节 自 然 条 件
在充分调查研究和必要的勘察工作基础上，全面地概述现有港区及规划发展区的气象、水文、地质、地貌、地震等的基本情况和江、海岸线资源的特点。
第三节 现 状
概述现有港区陆域、水域的基本情况；码头岸线、泊位、库场、装卸线、配套设施及其能力；上一个五年计划和规划前一年的客、货吞吐量；重要公用设施、各种集疏运方式（水路、航道、公路、铁路、管道）的布局、线路长度、技术标准、能力等基本情况。
第四节 评 价
通过对地理位置、自然条件和现状的分析，综合评价港口在国民经济和区域经济发展及综合运输体系中所处的地位、作用、发展条件；提出港口的发展优势和存在问题。
第二章 吞吐量发展水平预测
第一节 经 济 腹 地
阐明经过论证后的经济腹地（包括直接腹地与间接腹地），与毗邻港口经济腹地的关系。
第二节 吞吐量发展水平预测
分析论证经济腹地经济发展的特点和趋势，提出规划期内二000年与二0二0年的货、客吞吐量预测水平。以附表说明各规划水平年主要货种的进出口、内外贸及各种集疏运方式的客、货吞吐量。
详细调查、分析、论证报告作为附件。
第三章 性质和功能
阐明港口的性质、功能，明确今后发展方向和目标。
第四章 船型发展预测
根据预测货种及吞吐量、流向、港区自然条件等，确定不同港区、不同规划水平年、不同货种的代表船型。
第五章 岸线利用规划
第一节 规 划 原 则
根据港口的地位、作用、性质和功能，按照统筹规划、合理布局的原则，结合岸线资源特点，提出具体的岸线利用规划原则。
第二节 岸线利用规划
根据海（江）岸线的实测资料，结合自然条件和利用情况，与城市总体规划相协调。通过方案论证，提出公用码头、工作船码头、货主码头区、沿海（沿江）工业区、旅游生活区等各类港区岸线利用规划方案及远期预留岸线。
第六章 总体布局规划
第一节 规 划 原 则
根据港区特点和发展要求，按照功能并举、合理分工、协调发展、集疏运畅通、互不干扰的原则，提出规划期限港区总体布局规划的具体原则。
第二节 陆域布局规划
根据规划期限的吞吐量、货种和船型，确定不同性质的港区；根据自然条件、港区性质，确定各港区的平面布局和高程规划；核算确定各类港区所需的生产、生活、安全、公用设施所必需的陆域面积和陆域纵深（商港陆域纵深原则上按不少于1．0—1．5公里考虑）；规划港区陆域
。
第三节 水域布局规划
根据到港船舶所需的确保安全的锚泊区和进港安全航行需要，结合水域条件，提出水域（包括航道、锚地、抛泥区、港池掩护、助导航等设施）布局规划。
第四节 港 界
根据港区陆域、水域的布局规划，阐明港区水、陆域范围和界限，并计算出轮廓线控制点的坐标，及为将来发展预留港区的位置及范围。
第七章 配套工程布局规划
港口配套工程主要包括：疏港公路、内河、公路、管道和给排水、供电、通信导航以及安全监督、救助打捞、港作船舶、航务、航道等，应分别分析、阐明各个规划阶段其能力和需求的适应程度，并制定相应的布局规划。
第八章 环境影响评价及环境保护规划
根据港区规划中货种的流量和特点，重点研究港口水、陆域的主要污染源，制定各个规划阶段的防污染综合治理措施以及港区规划绿地的平面布局。主要内容有：
第一节 规划港区的环境现状
第二节 规划期各个阶段的主要污染源和污染物分析
第三节 港区可能出现的生态变化
第四节 控制污染和生态变化的规划和治理措施
第五节 环境影响分析和评价
第九章 规划的分期实施
根据各个规划阶段的吞吐量发展水平和水、陆域平面布局，提出港口总体布局规划分期实施的、相互衔接的建设序列。
第十章 问题及建议
主要反映总体布局规划中有待进一步科研、论证的重大技术问题和需要上级主管机关解决的重大问题。
附 图
1．经济腹地形势图
2．港口所在地理位置图
3．港口现状图
4．港口总体布局规划图
5．港口集疏运通道规划图
6．港口水、陆域界限图
附 件
吞吐量发展水平预测报告
1990年2月4日
Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
